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Ernest Renan famously declared that Ibn Rushd/Averroes (d. 595/1198) was the “last 
representative” of philosophy in the Arab and Islamic world.2 We now know that Ibn Rushd 
was by no means the last. Instead, the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā/Avicenna (d. 428/1037) 
triggered an “Avicennan pandemic” that spread throughout the lands of medieval Islam and 
profoundly shaped Islamic thought down to the nineteenth century.3 Ibn Rushd did not enjoy a 
comparable fortune. While he stirred debate in medieval Europe, his influence in the Islamic 
world appears to have been minimal. Peter Adamson in the introduction to the 2011 edited 
volume In the Age of Averroes briefly surveys possible reasons for this. One is that Ibn Rushd 
lived in Andalusia, far from the central lands of Islam. Adamson does not think this sufficient 
to explain his lack of impact. Instead, Adamson argues, it likely has to do with Ibn Rushd’s 
links to the ruling Almohads, who many opponents took to be heretics, and even more so with 
the fact that Ibn Rushd did not engage the prevailing philosophy of Ibn Sīnā directly. He 
circumvented it by calling for a return to Aristotle.4 Yet, even if the Islamic world took far 
more interest in Ibn Sīnā than Ibn Rushd, the Andalusian philosopher was not ignored 
entirely. The Damascene traditionalist theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) has much to 
say about Ibn Rushd and quotes him extensively. This attention to Ibn Rushd is extraordinary, 
                                                 
1 The research for this publication was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Fellowship. All translations from the 
Qurʾān and other Arabic texts are my own. 
2 This statement is found in both the first and last editions of Ernest Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme: essai 
historique, 1st ed. (Paris, A. Durand, 1852), 1; and 4th ed. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), 2. 
3 Jean R. Michot, “La pandémie avicennienne au VIe/XIIe siècle: présentation, editio princeps et traduction de 
l’introduction du Livre de l’advenue du monde (Kitāb ḥudūth al-ʿālam) d’Ibn Ghaylān Al-Balkhī,” Arabica 40 
(1993): 287-344. As examples of the literature on Ibn Sīnā’s influence on medieval and early modern Islamic 
thought, see Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicenna’s Islamic Reception,” in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays, ed. 
Peter Adamson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 190-213; and Heidrun Eichner, 
“Handbooks in the Tradition of Later Eastern Ashʿarism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. 
Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 494-514. 
4 Peter Adamson, “Introduction,” in: In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century, ed. 
Peter Adamson (London: The Warburg Institute, 2011), 1-7 (3, 7). Oliver Leaman, Averroes and his Philosophy, 
rev. ed. (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1998), 176-177, lists further reasons suggested by earlier scholars for Ibn 
Rushd’s lack of influence. 
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especially when no one else in the medieval Islamic east seems to have shown much concern 
for him.5 This, too, requires explanation. Why was Ibn Rushd of interest to Ibn Taymiyya and 
not to others? 
 Before addressing this question, attention must first be given to the relevant texts and 
recent research. Ibn Taymiyya refers to Ibn Rushd in several of his books,6 and he quotes him 
extensively in his two long works Bayān talbīs al-jahmiyya [hereafter Bayān] and Darʾ 
taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa al-naql [hereafter Darʾ]. Bayān—eight volumes in the 2005 Medina 
edition—is a refutation of the Ashʿarī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) Taʾsīs 
al-taqdīs, which is in turn a rebuttal of Karrāmī and Ḥanbalī anthropomorphism.7 Ibn 
Taymiyya wrote Bayān between Ramaḍān 705/April 1306 and Dhū al-Ḥijja 706/June 1307 
while imprisoned in Cairo on charges of corporealism.8 In Bayān Ibn Taymiyya quotes at 
length from Ibn Rushd’s al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla [hereafter Kashf], which outlines 
what the general public should believe, and also selections from Ibn Rushd’s Faṣl al-maqāl, 
which explicates the religious obligation to engage in philosophy.9 Ibn Taymiyya’s second 
                                                 
5 Henry Corbin, “En Orient, après Averroès,” in: Multiple Averroès: Actes du Colloque International organisé à 
l’occasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d’Averroès. Paris 20-23 septembre 1976, ed. Jean Jolivet 
(Paris: Les belles lettres, 1978), 323-332. Corbin claims that he had not found even one reference to Ibn Rushd 
in the Islamic east before the seventeenth century (323-324). Ibn Rushd did apparently receive some attention in 
the medieval Islamic west; see Yamina Adouhane, “Al-Miklātī, A Twelfth Century Ašʿarite,” Arabic Sciences 
and Philosophy 22.2 (2012): 155-197 (155-156). Adouhane argues that the Maghribī Ashʿarī theologian Abū al-
Hajjāj al-Miklātī (d. 626/1228-1229) drew on Ibn Rushd, albeit without acknowledgement, in his work Kitāb 
lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī al-radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-usūl. 
6 See for example Al-Jawāb al-ṣaḥīḥ li-man baddala dīn al-Masīḥ, ed. ʿAlī ibn Ḥasan ibn Nāṣir, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
ibn Ibrāhīm al-ʿAskar, and Ḥamdān ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamdān, 7 vols. (Riyadh: Dār al-ʿāṣima, 1993-1999), 
5:19, 31; Kitāb al-radd ʿalā al-manṭiqiyyīn, ed. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Sharaf al-Dīn al-Kutubī (Bombay: Al-Maṭbaʿa 
al-qayyima, 1368/1949), 148; Kitāb al-ṣafadiyya, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, 2 parts in 1 vol. (Manṣūra, 
Egypt: Dār al-hudā al-nabawiyya, 1421/2000), 1:149, 2:186; Kitāb al-nubuwwāt, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Ṣāliḥ al-
Ṭuwayyān, 3 vols. (Medina: al-Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiyya bi-l-Madīna al-Munawwara, ʿImādat al-baḥth al-ʿilmī, 
1420/2000), 1:364, 459, 2:760; and Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqḍ kalām al-Shīʿa al-Qadariyya, ed. 
Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, 9 vols. (Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1986), 1:199, 
236, 246, 323, 348, 356, 357, 374, 375, 399, 402, 2:281. 
7 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān talbīs al-Jahmiyya fī taʾsīs bidaʿihim al-kalāmiyya, ed. Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad al-
Hunaydī, et al., 10 vols. 2d printing (Medina: Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahd li-tibāʿat al-muṣḥaf al-sharīf, 1426/2005); 
volumes 1-8 contain the edited text; volume 9 comprises studies on the text; and volume 10 is indexes. Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī, Taʾsīs al-taqdīs, ed. Anas Muḥammad ʿAdnān al-Sharafāwī and Aḥmad Muḥammad Khayr al-
Khaṭīb (Damascus: Dār nūr al-ṣabāḥ, 2011); also known as Asās al-taqdīs as in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Asās al-
taqdīs, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-azhariyya, 1406/1986). 
8 For the dating and circumstances of Ibn Taymiyya’s writing of Bayān, see Jon Hoover, “Early Mamlūk 
Ashʿarīs against Ibn Taymiyya on the nonliteral reinterpretation of God’s attributes (taʾwīl),” in: Philosophical 
Theology in Islam: The Later Ashʿarite Tradition, ed. Jan Thiele and Ayman Shihadeh (Leiden: Brill, 
forthcoming). 
9 Editions of Ibn Rushd’s al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla will be discussed below. Further reference to Faṣl al-
maqāl will be to Averroës, Decisive Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory [Arabic and English], trans. Charles E. 
Butterworth (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2001), 1-33; an earlier English translation is found in 
Ibn Rushd (Averroes), On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy: A Translation, with Introduction and Notes, 
of Ibn Rushd’s Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl, with Its Appendix (Ḍamīma) and an Extract from Kitāb al-kashf ʿan manāhij 
al-adilla (London: Luzac, 1961). For a recent analysis of Faṣl al-maqāl, see Caterina Belo, Averroes and Hegel 
on Philosophy and Religion (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 21-47. For references to and quotations from Ibn 
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tome Darʾ comes to ten volumes in the edition of Rashād Sālim and dates to 713/1313 or 
later.10 In Darʾ Ibn Taymiyya argues that there is no contradiction between reason and 
revelation, and he quotes several selections from Ibn Rushd’s Kashf and the latter’s Tahāfut 
al-tahāfut11 refuting the Tahāfut al-falāsifa12 of al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), as well as nearly the 
whole of his short Ḍamīma.13 
There is furthermore the question of which text of Kashf Ibn Taymiyya quotes. In a 
2005 study, Marc Geoffroy explains that Ibn Rushd wrote two distinct versions of Kashf. The 
first version was composed in 575/1179-1180. At the outset, Ibn Rushd divides human beings 
into the general public (jumhūr) and the learned elite (ʿulamāʾ), and he explains that the 
treatise is devoted to explaining what the general public should believe. Whereas the elite for 
example know that God is incorporeal, the general public should not deny that God has a 
body so as not to sow confusion concerning the affirmations of revelation. Then, Ibn Rushd 
carefully sidelines Ashʿarī theological positions dominant among the Almohads ruling 
Andalusia and North Africa at the time in favor of views more amenable to Aristotelianism. 
Geoffroy suggests that Ibn Rushd’s aim in doing this is to offer an alternative expression of 
Almohad orthodoxy. This effort failed, and Geoffroy shows that Ibn Rushd, apparently under 
duress, rewrote the section in Kashf on God and body to conform to the teaching of Almohad 
founder Ibn Tūmart (d. 524/1130) that everyone—even the general public—must affirm 
God’s incorporeality. Ibn Rushd justifies his new view not from the texts of revelation but as 
required by the needs of the time to ward off corporealist error.14 
The first version of Kashf is preserved in MS Escurial 632, fols. 20v–74r, which is the 
sole source for the first modern edition, by Müller in 1859,15 and the primary source for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rushd in Ibn Taymiyya’s Bayān, see the index entries in Bayān, 10:210 (Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 
Muḥammad Ibn Rushd), 10:256-257 (Faṣl al-maqāl), and 10:260 ([al-Kashf ʿan] manāhij al-adilla). 
10 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa al-naql, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, 11 vols. (Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-
Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1979-1983). On the dating of Darʾ, see Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s 
Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 10-11, 
11 Averroès. Tahafot at-Tahafot, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930); trans. Simon van 
den Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut, 2 vols. (London: Luzac, 1954). 
12 Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham 
Young University, 1997). 
13 The Arabic of al-Ḍamīma (Risālat al-ihdāʾ) is printed with an English translation in Averroës, Decisive 
Treatise & Epistle Dedicatory, 38-42. For references to and quotations from Ibn Rushd in Darʾ, see the index 
entries in Darʾ, 11:77-78 (Ibn Rushd), 11:329-330 (Tahāfut al-tahāfut), and 11:345-346 ([al-Kashf ʿan] manāhij 
al-adilla). Ibn Taymiyya’s quotes Ibn Rushd’s Ḍamīma in Darʾ 9:383-390. 
14 Marc Geoffroy, “À Propos de l’almodhadisme d’Averroès: L’anthropomorphisme (taǧsīm) dans la seconde 
version du Kitāb al-kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla,” in Los Almohades: problemas y perspectivas, ed. Patrice 
Cressier, Maribel Fierro, and Luis Molina, 2 vols. (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 
2005), 2:853–894. On Ibn Rushd’s rewriting of Kashf, see also Maribel Fierro, “The Religious Policy of the 
Almohads,” in: The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 679-692 (681-683). 
15 Marcus Joseph Müller, Philosophie und Theologie von Averroes (Munich: G. Franz, 1859), 27-127 (Arabic), 
26-118 (German). 
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later editions of Qāsim (1964)16 and al-Jābirī (1998).17 Qāsim also consulted MS Taymūriyya, 
ḥikma 129 located in Dār al-kutub in Cairo and noted that it contained various additions, but 
he did not include these in his edition, nor recognize the significance of the revised text. 
Geoffroy has now identified MS Istanbul, Köprülü 1601, fols. 117v – 194v, as a better 
witness to this same revised text. This manuscript contains additions mentioning Ibn Tūmart 
and affirming Almohad doctrines and deletions of material offending orthodox Almohad 
sensibilities. Geoffroy provides an edition of the chapter on God and body from the later 
version of Kashf and translates key passages to illustrate Ibn Rushd’s retraction of his earlier 
views.18 
Geoffroy observes that Ibn Taymiyya copies parts of Ibn Rushd’s second Arabic 
version of the chapter on God and body into his Darʾ.19 From this, Geoffroy surmises that it 
was only this last version that circulated in eastern Islamic lands.20 However, Ibn Taymiyya in 
fact copies the first version of the Kashf discussion on God and body into Bayān. None of the 
revisions found in the later version are included.21 It is thus apparent that Ibn Taymiyya had 
access to both Arabic versions of Ibn Rushd’s Kashf, at least by the time he wrote Darʾ. It 
                                                 
16 Ibn Rushd, Manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, ed. Maḥmūd Qāsim, 2d ed. (Cairo: Maktabat al-anjlū al-
Miṣriyya, 1964. Qāsim also published an earlier edition with the same press in 1955 based on MS Taymūriyya, 
ḥikma 133, which, unbeknownst to Qāsim, was a copy of Müller’s edition; for details see Geoffroy, “À Propos 
de l’almodhadisme d’Averroès,” 856-857. Qāsim’s 1964 edition of Kashf is translated as Averroes, Faith and 
Reason in Islam: Averroes’ Exposition of Religious Arguments, trans. Ibrahim Najjar (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001). 
A nearly full translation of Kashf from a 1910 Cairo printing is found in J. Windrow Sweetman, Islam and 
Christian Theology, 2 parts in 2 vols. each (London: Lutterworth, 1945-1967), 2.2.82-180, and there is also a 
Spanish translation of Kashf in Manuel Alonso, Teología de Averroës: estudios y documentos (Madrid: Consejo 
Superior de Investigagiones Científicas, Instituto Miguel Asin, 1947), 203-355. 
17 Ibn Rushd, Al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, ed. Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz 
dirāsāt al-waḥda ʿarabiyya, 1998); subsequent references to Kashf in this study will be to this edition. 
18 Geoffroy, “À Propos de l’almodhadisme d’Averroès,” 886-894 (Arabic text); the Arabic text indicates 
additions in bold and places deletions between two short vertical lines in a smaller font. Marc Geoffroy, “Ibn 
Rušd et la théologie almohadist: une version inconnue du Kitāb al-kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla dans deux 
manuscrits d’Istanbul,” Medioevo 26 (2001): 327-356, provides a detailed introduction to MS Istanbul, Köprülü 
1601 and a later Istanbul witness to the second version of Kashf. Extending the work of Geoffroy, Silvia Di 
Donato, “Le Kitāb al-kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla d’Averroès: Les phases de la rédaction dans les discours sur 
l’existence de Dieu et sur la direction, d’après l’original arabe et la traduction hébraïque,” Arabic Sciences and 
Philosophy 25 (2015): 105-133, studies an anonymous Hebrew translation of Kashf that includes additions to the 
first Arabic version, especially in the early part of the treatise on the existence of God. These additions are then 
for the most part included in the second Arabic version along with further additions and modifications. The 
Hebrew translation does not include revisions of passages undermining Almohad doctrine, and Di Donato argues 
that it probably derives from a lost revision of the first Arabic text that was then further revised as the second 
Arabic version to placate Almohad orthodoxy. 
19 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 10:248-300; Frank Griffel, “Ibn Tūmart’s Rational Proof for God’s Existence and Unity, 
and His Connection to the Niẓāmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad,” in: Los Almohades: problemas y perspectivas, 
2:753-813 (795 n 127), also notes Ibn Taymiyya’s inclusion of a revised version of the Kashf chapter on God 
and corporeality into Darʾ and translates two of its key additions (797, 800). 
20 Geoffroy, “À Propos de l’almodhadisme d’Averroès,” 861. 
21 Going beyond the chapter on God and body in Kashf studied by Geoffroy, Di Donato, “Le Kitāb al-kašf,” 128-
130, examines an addition to the chapter on God and location (jiha) mentioning Ibn Tūmart. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
quotation of this passage in Bayān, 1:162, does not include this addition, which further confirms that he is 
quoting the first version of the Arabic text. He also does not include this addition when quoting the same passage 
in Darʾ 6:216, which means that he quotes from both versions of Kashf within Darʾ. 
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may be that he knew only the first version when writing Bayān, but it is also possible that he 
was by then already acquainted with both versions but chose not to use the latter because, as 
we will see below, its call for even the general public to affirm God’s incorporeality did not 
serve his purposes. 
As is evident from Geoffroy’s remarks, knowledge of Ibn Taymiyya’s interest in Ibn 
Rushd is not new to modern scholarship. When Ibn Rushd’s Kashf and Faṣl al-maqāl were 
published together in Cairo in the early twentieth century, Ibn Taymiyya’s comments in Darʾ 
on the first two chapters of Kashf and a brief part of the third chapter were compiled and 
added as an appendix.22 Additionally, a number of studies, mostly in Arabic, have examined 
Ibn Taymiyya’s relation to Ibn Rushd. This research shows that, despite shared interests in 
reconciling reason and revelation, Ibn Taymiyya is scathingly critical of Ibn Rushd for his 
division of humanity into the learned elite who can access the truth through logical 
demonstration (burhān) and the general public who are limited to the realm of rhetoric, and 
for positing revelation as a presentation of religion appropriate to the level of the general 
public but something different from the rational truth accessible to the elite. Despite this, Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Rushd concur to a great extent on what the plain senses (ẓāhir) of the 
revealed texts mean. They agree that the texts do not deny corporeality of God, and thus they 
reject Ashʿarī kalām proofs for God’s incorporeality. They also agree that the revelation 
supports God’s continuous creation of the world from eternity, and they therefore reject the 
emanation metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā and kalām proofs for the existence of God based on the 
temporal origination of the world. Yet, while Ibn Taymiyya makes use of Ibn Rushd’s 
arguments to refute the kalām theologians and Ibn Sīnā, he insists that the plain sense of the 
revealed text is true for everyone, not just the general public. For Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Rushd at 
the level of the general public treats the revelation as tantamount to falsehood and at the level 
                                                 
22 Ibn Rushd, Kitāb falsafat al-qāḍī al-fāḍil Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rushd al-Andalusī al-mushtamil ʿalā 
kitābayn jalīlayn, al-awwal Faṣl al-maqāl fī-mā bayna al-sharīʿa wa al-ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl wa Dhaylihi, wa al-
thānī al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla [wa-yalīhimā] al-Radd ʿalā falsafat Ibn Rushd al-ḥafīd 
taʾlīf Taqī al-Dīn ibn Taymiyya, 2d printing (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-jammāliyya, 1328/1910); Ibn Taymiyya’s 
quoted comments on the first chapter of Kashf dealing with God’s existence are from Darʾ 9:72-73, 78, 79-80, 
80-81, 82-84, 89-90, 110-112, 113, 123-124, 126, 128-129, 131, 132-133, 324, 330-331; his comments on the 
second chapter dealing with God’s unity are from Darʾ 9:338, 348-349, 350-351, 354, 371-373, 382-383; and his 
brief comment on God’s attribute of will in the third chapter is from Darʾ 10:198-199. Ibn Taymiyya also 
comments on further parts of Kashf in Darʾ, but these passages are not included in the appendix. Dominque 
Urvoy, Averroès: Les ambitions d’un intellectual musulman (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), 215 n 1, reports two 
other Cairene editions of Faṣl al-maqāl and Kashf including Ibn Taymiyya’s texts as an appendix, the first 
printed by al-Maṭbaʿa al-sharqiyya dated 1321/1903, and the second an undated printing by Maḥmūd ʿAlī 
Subayh. I was not able to inspect these editions, but they were apparently printed under the title Falsafat Ibn 
Rushd. The edition, Falsafat Ibn Rushd (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-maḥmūdiyya al-tijāriyya, 1388/1968), includes Ibn 
Taymiyya’s passages from Darʾ in the footnotes. 
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of the elite posits an incorporeal God stripped of attributes, especially His attributes of action, 
and so characterizes God as nothing more than an Aristotelian unmoved mover.23 
Research on Ibn Taymiyya’s relation to Ibn Rushd to this point has been based on 
Darʾ and discussions found in a number of other treatises, but no attention has been given to 
his interaction with Ibn Rushd in his early tome Bayān. This study will focus on Ibn 
Taymiyya’s use of Ibn Rushd’s Kashf in Bayān on the interconnected questions of God’s 
relation to body (jism) and direction or location (jiha) and God’s visibility in the hereafter.24 
This will show that Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude toward Ibn Rushd in Bayān is much the same as 
that found by earlier research on his other works. However, this study will also begin asking 
more forthrightly than previous studies what it is about the philosopher that Ibn Taymiyya 
finds useful for his own purposes, particularly on the questions of God and corporeality that 
are here in view. Ibn Taymiyya’s discussions of Ibn Rushd in Bayān fall within the first two 
volumes of the eight volume edition, and it here becomes apparent that quoting and 
commenting on Ibn Rushd is not simply a matter of critiquing the philosopher. Instead, Ibn 
Taymiyya puts Ibn Rushd to work marginalizing his opponent Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī from his 
self-proclaimed position as a mainstream rationalist theologian and refuting his arguments. 
There are in fact points in Bayān where Ibn Taymiyya simply lets Ibn Rushd do the hard work 
of making the rational argument for him, and this suggests that Ibn Taymiyya may have found 
                                                 
23 See especially Anke von Kügelgen, “Dialogpartner im Widerspruch: Ibn Rushd und Ibn Taymīya über die 
„Einheit der Wahrheit“,” in: In Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea: Studies on the 
Sources, Contents and Influences of Islamic Civilization and Arabic Philosophy and Science Dedicated to 
Gerhard Endress on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 455-481, 
which examines Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion of Ibn Rushd in Darʾ, focusing especially on his criticism of Ibn 
Rushd’s elitism and the question of divine corporeality; and ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAmmārī, Manāḥī naqd Ibn Taymiyya 
li-Ibn Rushd (Beirut: Jadāwil li-l-nashr wa-al-tawzīʿ, 2013), which provides a systematic exposition of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s views on Ibn Rushd from a wide range of sources apart from Bayān. Other studies include ʿAbd al-
Majīd al-Ṣaghīr, “Mawāqif rushdiyya li-Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya? Mulāḥaẓāt awwaliyya”, in: Dirāsāt 
maghribiyya muhdāt ilā al-mufakkir al-maghribī Muḥammad ʿAzīz al-Hbābī 1st ed. (Rabat: 1985), 93-117; 2nd 
ed. (Rabat: Al-Markaz al-thaqīf; al-ʿarabī, 1987), 164-182; al-Ṭablāwī Maḥmūd Saʿd, Mawqif Ibn Taymiyya min 
falsafat Ibn Rushd: Fī al-ʿaqīda wa-ʿilm al-kalām wa al-falsafa (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-amāna, 1409/1989); and 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Talīlī, “Athar Ibn Rushd fī al-Mashriq al-ʿarabī: Tabīʿat al-radd al-Taymī ʿalā falsafat Ibn 
Rushd,” Al-Mishkāt 3 (2005): 55-70 (I am grateful to Nadjet Zouggar for sending me this article). See also 
Yahya J. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Risāla Aḍḥawiyya: Being a Translation 
of a Part of the Darʾ al-Taʿāruḍ of Ibn Taymiyya, with Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies 14.2 (2003): 149-203 (Part I) and 14.3 (2003): 309-363 (Part II), at pp. 168-172 of Part I, on Ibn 
Taymiyya’s criticism of Ibn Rushd’s esotericism; and Jon Hoover, “Perpetual Creativity in the Perfection of 
God: Ibn Taymiyya’s Hadith Commentary on God’s Creation of This World,” Journal of Islamic Studies 15.3 
(2004): 287-329 (290-291, 295), for comments on the similarity between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyya regarding 
continuous creation. Richard Taylor, “Averroes: God and the Noble Lie,” in: Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays 
in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 38-59, sorts 
through various western understandings of Ibn Rushd and then provides an analysis of his view of revealed 
religion as a “noble lie” that parallels Ibn Taymiyya’s reading of the Andalusian philosopher as distinguishing 
demonstrative truth for the elite from rhetoric for the general public. 
24 Ibn Taymiyya in Bayān also quotes from Kashf and Faṣl al-maqāl when discussing proofs for God’s 
existence, God’s creation of the world, and the interpretation of God’s attributes, but these discussions will be 
left aside in the interest of keeping the study to a manageable size. 
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difficulty defending his views rationally on his own and that he is perhaps learning from Ibn 
Rushd how to substantiate the argument. 
 
Invoking Ibn Rushd to subvert al-Rāzī’s claim to the rational mainstream 
As noted above, Ibn Taymiyya’s Bayān is a refutation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work 
Taʾsīs al-taqdīs, which constitutes in turn al-Rāzī’s refutation of theological 
anthropomorphism. In Taʾsīs al-Rāzī argues at length that God is not perceptible to the human 
senses, that God is independent of space and location, and that God is neither in the world nor 
distinct from the world in any particular direction. Thus, revealed texts suggesting that God 
has a body or is located above the heavens may not be interpreted according to their plain 
senses. Their meanings must be either reinterpreted to mean something else (taʾwīl) or 
delegated to God and given no further investigation (tafwīḍ).25 
To Ibn Taymiyya, a God imperceptible to the senses that exists neither inside nor 
outside the world does not exist at all. He retorts in Bayān that God is in fact perceptible to 
human senses such as sight and hearing.26 He refutes al-Rāzī’s arguments against qualifying 
God with body, space, and location, and he defends the plain senses of texts indicating God’s 
aboveness (fawqiyya) and overness (ʿulūw) and God’s sitting on the Throne (al-istiwāʾ ʿalā 
al-ʿarsh). He explains further that God’s sitting on the Throne is a report-based attribute (ṣifa 
khabariyya), which is known only by revealed tradition, whereas God’s being above the 
world is also known by reason and the human natural constitution (fiṭra).27 Through extensive 
rational argumentation, Ibn Taymiyya carves out conceptual space for the corporeality of 
God, but he does not explicitly affirm that God has a body. However, he does not deny it 
either, and he asserts that neither affirming nor denying was the view of the early Muslims 
(salaf).28 Lest he be accused of crass anthropomorphism, Ibn Taymiyya also stresses God’s 
uniqueness: while the plain senses of the revealed texts are known, there is no similarity 
between God and creatures, and the modality (kayfiyya) of God’s attributes is not known. This 
draws Ibn Taymiyya into a theological double perspective. On the one hand, there is no 
likeness between God and creatures, but, on the other, God is described with names and 
attributes that carry meanings in human language that are known and must be explained in a 
way that is fitting and worthy of God.29 Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments discussed in the rest of 
                                                 
25 Al-Rāzī, Taʾsīs, 46 (al-Rāzī’s opening propositions), 227-228 (rule of taʾwīl). 
26 See for example Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:353-355 
27 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:54, 94, 2:454. 
28 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:289-290; 8:536-546 
29 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:347-350. 
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this study operate within this latter perspective of the linguistic meanings of terms applied to 
God. The former perspective of God’s unlikeness lies in the background. 
Ibn Taymiyya brings Ibn Rushd into play first in Bayān to undermine and marginalize 
al-Rāzī’s pretension to speak for the rational mainstream of Islamic theology. Al-Rāzī 
positions himself as an advocate of prevailing rationality with two claims. Al-Rāzī’s first 
claim, which appears at the very beginning of Taʾsīs, is that “the great majority of rational and 
respectable people” are agreed that God is not spatially extended (mutaḥayyiz), that God is not 
subject to location (jiha), and that God neither dwells in the world nor is distinct from it. Al-
Rāzī’s “great majority” includes the philosophers who “have agreed on affirming existents 
that are not spatially extended and do not dwell in something spatially extended, like 
intellects, souls, and matter.”30 The second thing that al-Rāzī claims is that his opponents are 
the Karrāmīs and the Ḥanbalīs. He argues that they must, contrary to their own doctrine, 
acknowledge an existent that is not accessible to the senses. Otherwise, God would be 
divisible and made up of parts.31  
Ibn Taymiyya uses Ibn Rushd to confound both of al-Rāzī’s claims. As for the first, 
Ibn Taymiyya opposes al-Rāzī’s claim to majority belief by citing respected scholarly 
authorities who affirm that God is located in the direction “above.” These include Mālik ibn 
Anas (d. 179/795), the student of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) Abū Muṭīʿ al-Balkhī (d. 199/814), 
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the Ḥanbalī scholars Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrāʾ (d. 458/1066) and 
Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), and early kalām theologians such as Ibn Kullāb (d. ca. 240/855) 
and al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935).32 Along the way, Ibn Taymiyya observes, “The best of the 
philosophers (falāsifa), like Abū Walīd ibn Rushd, report that the doctrine of the philosophers 
(ḥukamāʾ) is affirming [God’s] overness above created things (ithbāt al-ʿulūw fawq al-
makhlūqāt).”33 A little later, Ibn Taymiyya introduces Ibn Rushd more fully as a commentator 
on Aristotle and the author of the Tahāfut al-tahāfut refuting al-Ghazālī. He criticizes Ibn 
Rushd for alleging that the elite have superior knowledge through demonstration that is not 
accessible to the general public. Yet, he is pleased to report that Ibn Rushd “transmitted 
affirmation of location [for God] from the philosophers and firmly established that by means 
                                                 
30 Al-Rāzī, Taʾsīs, 47; Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:59; Ibn Taymiyya also notes al-Rāzī’s claim briefly in Darʾ, 
6:246. 
31 Al-Rāzī, Taʾsīs, 50; Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:230-231. Ibn Taymiyya also alludes to al-Rāzī’s claim briefly in 
Darʾ, 6:245: “…whoever says that the dispute about [God’s overness (ʿuluw)] is only with the Karrāmīs and the 
Ḥanbalīs...” 
32 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:61-217. 
33 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:148-149. 
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of their rational methods, which they call demonstrations.”34 Ibn Taymiyya then proceeds to 
quote the entire section on God and location (jiha) from Ibn Rushd’s Kashf.35 
In this section on jiha, Ibn Rushd first reports that the early Muslims affirmed location 
of God up until the time when the Muʿtazilīs and later Ashʿarīs such as al-Juwaynī (d. 
478/1085) and his followers negated it. He then establishes the textual foundation of the 
doctrine and asserts its universality. He writes, “The plain senses of the whole revelation 
(ẓawāhir al-sharʿ kulluhā) require affirming location,” and he supports this with Qurʾānic 
proof texts such as, “The All-Merciful sat on the Throne” (Q. 20:5), “Eight [angels] will carry 
the Throne of your Lord above them on that day” (Q. 69:17), and, “The angels and the Spirit 
will ascend to Him” (Q. 70:4).36 Ibn Rushd states as well that religious prescriptions are based 
on God being in heaven because it is from heaven that the revelation descended. Moreover, 
Ibn Rushd asserts, “All of the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) are agreed that God and the angels are 
in heaven just as all the revelations are agreed on that.”37 
Ibn Rushd then addresses the Muʿtazilī and later Ashʿarī charge that affirming location 
of God necessarily implies that God is in a place (makān) and thus has a body (jism). Ibn 
Rushd denies this, and to circumvent it, he elaborates an Aristotelian cosmology that breaks 
the implication between location and place. He explains that the six directions or locations 
indicated by the outer surfaces of a body do not constitute its place. Only the surface of 
another body surrounding that body constitutes its place, like the air surrounding a human 
being is the human being’s place, or like the celestial sphere surrounding the air is the place of 
the air. Then, when it comes to the outermost sphere of the universe, it has no place because 
there is no body beyond it that encompasses it. There can be no further body or bodies beyond 
the outermost sphere because that would entail a sequence of bodies without end. The outer 
surface of the outermost sphere is not a place at all because it cannot contain another body. 
Moreover, Ibn Rushd in his Aristotelianism denies the possibility of void space and thereby 
rules out the existence of a void beyond the outermost sphere. Beyond the outermost sphere, 
there are no dimensions. 
Ibn Rushd then explains that the ancients spoke of the outermost sphere as the abode 
of spirits, that is, the realm of God and the angels, which is outside time and place.38 Ibn 
                                                 
34 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:156. 
35 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:158-166; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 145-149; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 62-67. 
36 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:158-159; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 145; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 62-63 (my translations 
of passages from Ibn Rushd, Kashf, do not follow those of Averroes, Faith and Reason).  
37 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:159; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 145; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 63. 
38 For further analysis of Ibn Rushd’s argument on location and its thoroughly Aristotelian character, see Barbara 
Canova, “Aristote et le Coran dans le Kitāb al-kašf ‘an manāhiǧ al-adilla d’Averroès,” in Averroes et la 
averroïsmes juif et latin: Actes du colloque international (Paris, 16-18 juin 2005), ed. Jean-Baptiste Brenet 
10 
 
 
Rushd concludes, “Establishing location is necessary according to revelation and reason,”39 
which is to say that both revelation and reason affirm that God is above the world but is not in 
a place and is not corporeal. However, Ibn Rushd clarifies, it is difficult to affirm location and 
deny corporeality together because this has no parallel in the visible world. It is for this reason 
that revelation does not deny body of God explicitly. The truth of the matter is known only to 
the elite, the philosophers, while the general public are either forbidden from seeking 
knowledge about it or they are given some kind of representation of it from the visible world. 
Ibn Rushd wraps up his section on location in Kashf with a discussion of the elite, the general 
public, and those in between who are subject to doubts, a disparaging reference to kalām 
theologians.40 
After quoting Ibn Rushd’s text, Ibn Taymiyya offers no comment on its Aristotelian 
character nor any of its other substantive aspects. His purpose is simply to show that 
philosophers affirm that God is in the location above, contrary to what al-Rāzī claims, and he 
continues on citing other scholarly authorities to show that al-Rāzī’s theological views are 
marginal. He expresses no embarrassment whatsoever that Ibn Rushd is his one and only 
example of a philosopher supporting his views against al-Rāzī. Somewhat later in Bayān, Ibn 
Taymiyya invokes the section on location in Kashf again and quotes parts of it to remake the 
point against al-Rāzī that the philosophers uphold location.41 Ibn Taymiyya is again spare 
with his comments, but he does highlight Aristotle as Ibn Rushd’s unmentioned source for his 
concept of place: “According to Aristotle, place (makān) is the inner surface of the body 
encompassing and in contact with the outer surface of the body encompassed.”42 
Even though Ibn Taymiyya has little to say about Ibn Rushd’s Aristotelian notions of 
place and space at this early point in Bayān, he does use them later in the work to build a 
rational argument against al-Rāzī. Al-Rāzī in Taʾsīs conceives of space as self-subsisting. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2007), 193-213 (196-208). For clarification of Ibn Rushd’s thought on the void, 
see Miklós Maróth, “Averroes on the Void,” in La lumière de l’intellect: La pensée scientifique et philosophique 
d’Averroès dans son temps, ed. Ahmad Hasnawi (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 11-22. 
39 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:162; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 147; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 64. 
40 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:159-166; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 145-149; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 63-67. 
41 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:403-406. 
42 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:405. Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ 6:5-7:140, discusses God and location at length including 
critiques of texts by Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī. Within this discussion, Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ, 6:212-237, quotes Ibn 
Rushd, Kashf, 145-159 (Averroes, Faith and Reason, 62-77) on location, textual interpretation, and the vision of 
God, to again make the point that the philosophers, apart from Ibn Sīnā and his followers, affirm that God is 
above the universe. Ibn Taymiyya’s accompanying discussion here (Darʾ 6:210-212, 237-249) is much fuller 
and more lucid than that of Bayān, and he again highlights Aristotle as the source of Ibn Rushd’s notion of place, 
but he does not add anything substantially new. Also, Ibn Taymiyya is here quoting from the first Arabic version 
of Kashf identified by Geoffroy and not the second that he quotes later in Darʾ when discussing God and body. 
As shown in Di Donato, “Le Kitāb al-kašf,” 128-130, Ibn Rushd’s discussion of location in the second version 
includes an addition expressing deference to Ibn Tūmart’s denial of location even if not complete acceptance. 
This is of no use to Ibn Taymiyya’s argument, and, assuming that he had read this part of the second version of 
Kashf, it is understandable that he preferred to ignore it and keep to the wording of the first version. 
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Space exists on its own apart from the objects within it. Al-Rāzī then argues that a spatially 
extended and located God would be in need of the space and location that He occupies within 
that wider expanse of self-subsisting space.43 Ibn Taymiyya is diffident about speaking of 
God using the non-scriptural term spatial extension (taḥayyuz), but he provides a counter 
argument anyway to preclude al-Rāzī’s alleged errors. He denies the existence of any free-
standing space that God might be thought to occupy. Space does not exist apart from spatially 
extended objects. Rather, the space that a spatially extended God might be said to occupy 
derives from God himself. It does not exist apart from God, and God in no way depends upon 
it for His existence.44 For Ibn Taymiyya then, in this argument against al-Rāzī at least, God is 
tantamount to a vast spatial extension encompassing the world. Put another way, it could 
perhaps be said that Ibn Taymiyya builds on Ibn Rushd’s Aristotelian cosmology by adding 
another sphere above the outermost sphere, with this additional sphere being God. 
Al-Rāzī’s second claim about his position within the world of Islamic theology is that 
the Ḥanbalīs and the Karrāmīs are his opponents, and he assumes that their view that God is 
accessible to the senses leads to affirming composition and corporeality in God. Ibn 
Taymiyya denies that this is so. He allows that al-Rāzī’s polemic might apply to some 
Ḥanbalīs in Khurasān, but he says that it does not apply to the best of the Ḥanbalīs, nor to all 
Karrāmīs. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya argues, it is al-Rāzī who is opposed by all the prophets, the 
first three generations of the salaf, all the great leaders of the Muslim community, kalām 
theologians like al-Ashʿarī and al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), and even by “the intelligent among 
the philosophers” (ḥudhdhāq al-falāsifa). Again, his only example of a philosopher is Ibn 
Rushd.45 When introducing Ibn Rushd here, Ibn Taymiyya mentions his Tahāfut al-tahāfut, 
Faṣl al-maqāl (called Taqrīr al-maqāl), and Kashf (identified as Manāhij al-adilla), and he 
turns especially to Kashf where Ibn Rushd maintains that it is incorrect to deny God’s 
corporeality at the exoteric level (fī al-ẓāhir) of the general public even if the learned elite 
deny it at the esoteric level (fī al-bāṭin). Ibn Taymiyya characterizes Kashf as follows: 
 
This book includes elucidation of the creed (iʿtiqād) that the revelation (sharīʿa) 
set forth and the obligation to present it to the general public just as the revelation 
set it forth, and elucidation of the part of that [creed] which has been furnished 
with demonstrative proof (burhān) for the learned, similar to what is supported by 
what compels assent for the general public. In it he mentioned what, according to 
                                                 
43 Al-Rāzī, Taʾsīs, 86-89. 
44 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 3:590-675. 
45 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:231-235 (235). 
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his method, must not be stated openly to the general public, and in it he mentioned 
what is necessary among the things that have been furnished with demonstrative 
proof according to the method of those who employ it. Also, he mentioned that it 
is not appropriate at the level of revelation to say that God is a body or is not a 
body, even though he does say that God is not a body at the esoteric level. Despite 
this, he affirms location esoterically and exoterically, and he mentions that this is 
the view of the philosophers.46 
 
Immediately after this introduction, Ibn Taymiyya quotes Ibn Rushd’s entire discussion of 
God and body (jism) from Kashf to undermine al-Rāzī’s unrelenting incorporealism. The 
quotation is from the first version of Kashf and not the later version in which Ibn Rushd 
makes concessions to Ibn Tūmart.47 The essentials of Ibn Rushd’s argument are as follows. 
Revelation is silent on whether God is corporeal. The revelation does mention God’s face and 
hands, but it does not explicitly affirm that God has a body. However, the revelation also does 
not deny body of God, and the general public, following revelation, should not deny body of 
God either. This, according to Ibn Rushd, is for three reasons. First, the kalām proofs for 
God’s incorporeality are not demonstrative, and the fact that kalām theologians describe God 
as an essence with attributes added to that essence actually entails corporeality in God. 
Second, the general public cannot imagine something that is beyond sense perception. So, 
denying that God has a body would lead them to conclude that God does not exist at all. 
Third, explicitly denying corporeality of God could sow doubts among the general public 
about what the revelation reports concerning the hereafter and the vision of God. This is to be 
avoided so as not to undermine religious adherence. Ibn Rushd then compares the revelation’s 
silence on God’s corporeality to its reserve in speaking about the soul (nafs). Revelation does 
not define the soul because of “the difficulty in furnishing a demonstrative proof for the 
general public for the existence of a self-subsisting existent that is not a body.”48 Ibn Rushd 
then raises the question of how the general public should think of God if body is to be neither 
affirmed nor denied of Him. He responds that they should think of God as light since the 
Qurʾān says, “God is the light of the heavens and the earth” (Q. 24:35). Light can also be 
                                                 
46 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:235-236. 
47 As noted above, Ibn Taymiyya does quote the later version of Ibn Rushd’s Kashf discussion of God and body, 
which includes additions speaking of Ibn Tūmart, into Darʾ, 10:248-300 (quotations interspersed with Ibn 
Taymiyya’s commentary and refutation). In Darʾ Ibn Taymiyya’s concern in discussing this text is to criticize 
Ibn Rushd and Ibn Tūmart’s views directly, and not to use the text to undermine the likes of al-Rāzī. The later 
version of Kashf thus serves Ibn Taymiyya’s purposes in Darʾ better than the first version which is closer to his 
own views. 
48 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:241; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 141; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 60. 
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perceived by the senses, which is important to the general public. Yet, light has no body, 
which means that people of demonstration should also think of God as light.49 
After completing the quote from Ibn Rushd’s discussion of God and body, Ibn 
Taymiyya comments,   
 
It becomes plain in this passage that [Ibn Rushd] on the esoteric level takes the 
view of the philosophers, which is that the soul is not a body, and the Creator is 
likewise [not a body]. However, he does not allow the general public to be told 
about this because it is, to their minds, impossible. Thus, he gave them the best 
and nearest of similitudes by mentioning the term “light.” This is the view of the 
leaders of the philosophers in matters similar to it like belief in God and the Last 
Day. He made plain by clear arguments that the denial mentioned by the kalām 
theologians opposes revelation, and he is correct about that at both the esoteric 
and exoteric levels. He made plain that the kalām theologians’ denial of body of 
God is based on weak arguments, and he made the corruption [of those 
arguments] plain. He mentioned that [God’s incorporeality] is known only if it is 
known that the soul is not a body. Now, it is known that what he and his 
philosopher colleagues point to [here] is weaker than that for which he faults the 
kalām theologians. In fact, the kalām theologians have shown that [the 
philosophers’] arguments are corrupt. [The kalām arguments] are better than [the 
arguments] that the [philosophers] use to show that the arguments of the kalām 
theologians are corrupt. Analysis of both groups shows that the arguments of both 
groups for negating body [of God] are invalid. It is apparent that the philosophers’ 
claim that the soul is not a body and that it is qualified with neither motion nor 
rest and neither entering nor exiting and that it only senses by means of the 
imagination (taṣawwur) is invalid. It is likewise with their view of the angels. The 
invalidity of the view of these [philosophers] is more apparent than the invalidity 
of the view of the kalām theologians in matters like this regarding the Lord.50 
 
Ibn Taymiyya rejects Ibn Rushd’s arguments for the incorporeality of God on the esoteric 
level as even weaker than the arguments of the kalām theologians. He is happy to let the 
                                                 
49 Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 138-145; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 56-62. 
50 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:247-248. Following this commentary, Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 1:248-249, requotes the 
first portion of Ibn Rushd’s discussion of God and location (Kashf, 145; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 62-63) that 
immediately follows the section on God and body in Kashf. 
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kalām theologians and the philosophers demolish each other’s arguments because it leaves 
standing his own view—and the view of Ibn Rushd on the exoteric level—that corporeality is 
neither affirmed nor denied of God. Ibn Taymiyya does not build a rational case of his own 
for this view. Instead, he allows Ibn Rushd to speak unimpeded, and he leans on the 
philosopher to make the rational case for the general public’s approach to revelation. That 
aside, Ibn Taymiyya’s stated purpose for quoting these passages on body and location from 
Ibn Rushd’s Kashf is no more than to refute al-Razi’s claims that the philosophers agree with 
him and that his only opponents are Ḥanbalīs and Karrāmīs. Ibn Taymiyya insists that Ibn 
Rushd represents the philosophical mainstream and that al-Rāzī faces stiff opposition not only 
from Ḥanbalīs and Karrāmīs but from the philosophers as well. Ibn Taymiyya’s contention is 
of course disingenuous. Al-Rāzī was not aware of Ibn Rushd so far as we know. The two 
scholars were twelfth-century contemporaries living at opposite ends of the Islamic world—
al-Rāzī in the east and Ibn Rushd in the west. 
Despite his audacity and ingenuity in invoking Ibn Rushd to supplant Ibn Sīnā and 
marginalize al-Rāzī, Ibn Taymiyya does not regard the Andalusian philosopher an 
unequivocal ally, particularly on the question of God and location. A bit later in Bayān, Ibn 
Taymiyya quotes a passage from Faṣl al-maqāl in which Ibn Rushd distinguishes between 
two categories of plain senses in the revelation with regard to the question of reinterpretation 
(taʾwīl). One category of plain sense may not be reinterpreted by anyone, whereas the second 
category must be reinterpreted by the elite, the people of demonstration, lest they become 
unbelievers. Under this latter category fall revealed texts affirming God’s sitting and 
descending. Those capable of demonstration must reinterpret these texts, but those incapable 
of demonstration may imagine them in their corporeal senses.51 Ibn Taymiyya takes this to be 
a straight contradiction with what Ibn Rushd affirms in Kashf. In Kashf, the plain sense of 
revealed texts indicating location do not need to be reinterpreted, neither by the general public 
nor by the elite, since in Ibn Rushd’s Aristotelian universe God and the angels are located in 
the outer sphere, the abode of spiritual entities.52 
 
Calling on Ibn Rushd to argue for the vision of God 
Ibn Taymiyya’s last use of Ibn Rushd in Bayān occurs about one-quarter way into the 
work. This is a clear instance of Ibn Taymiyya calling on Ibn Rushd to provide the rational 
argument, in this case against Ashʿarī efforts to affirm the vision of God in the hereafter. Ibn 
Taymiyya’s discussion falls within a long refutation of al-Rāzī’s assertion that God is neither 
                                                 
51 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:90-93; Averroës, Decisive Treatise, 19-20. 
52 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:93-94. 
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inside the world nor outside it.53 Ibn Taymiyya argues that God must be an existent accessible 
to the senses because God would otherwise be nothing at all. He asserts, “The People of the 
Sunna and the Community (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa) confess that God—Exalted is He—is 
seen, and they are agreed that what cannot be known by any of the senses is nothing but a 
non-existent, not an existent.”54 Thus, Ibn Taymiyya explains, al-Rāzī’s understanding of God 
who is inaccessible to the senses is tantamount to a non-existent even though al-Rāzī affirms 
that God is a self-subsisting reality with properties distinguishing Him from other realities.55 
Turning to the vision of God in the hereafter, Ibn Taymiyya notes that the Muʿtazilīs 
and the philosophers deny the vision because it would require God to be a spatially extended 
body and would situate Him in a particular direction or location (jiha) relative to the person 
who sees Him. Ibn Taymiyya himself affirms that God will indeed be seen in the hereafter 
and that God will be situated in a location relative to those seeing Him.56 He notes, however, 
that some Ashʿarīs and the Ḥanbalī theologian Abū Yaʿlā affirm that God will be seen without 
location. Moreover, he claims that some later Ashʿarīs like al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī come close 
to the Muʿtazilīs by interpreting the vision as an increase in knowledge.57 Others say that God 
will be seen but “not above the one seeing [Him], neither to his right nor his left, and not in 
any of his [other] directions.”58 Ibn Taymiyya condemns these views as denials of the vision, 
and he claims that such a denials are opposed by revelation, reason, and the human natural 
constitution (fiṭra). He then quotes the full discussion of the vision of God from Kashf in 
order to let Ibn Rushd do the difficult work of demolishing the Ashʿarī arguments that an 
incorporeal God may be seen.59 
Ibn Rushd first observes that the Muʿtazilīs deny both corporeality and location of 
God, and thus the vision of God as well, since everything seen is situated in a location relative 
to the one who sees it. Ibn Rushd then notes that Ashʿarīs have difficulty combining God’s 
incorporeality with the possibility of seeing something that has no body. Thus, Ibn Rushd 
                                                 
53 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:325-455. For an overview of the vision in the early Islamic tradition, see Claude 
Gilliot, “La vision de Dieu dans l’au-delà: Exégèse, tradition et théologie en islam,” in: Pensée grecque et 
sagesse d’orient hommage à Michel Tardieu, ed. Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, et al. (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2009), 237-269. 
54 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:341. 
55 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:363-365. 
56 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:392-433. 
57 For a discussion of al-Rāzī’s arguments on the vision of God, see Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafsīr in the 
Major Works of Fakhr Al-Dīn Al-Rāzī (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1996), 146-154. For the views of al-Ashʿarī and other early kalām theologians, see Daniel Gimaret, 
La doctrine d’al-Ashʿarī (Paris: Cerf, 1990), 329-344. 
58 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:433-435 (435). 
59 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:436-450; Ibn Rushd, Kashf, 185-191; Averroes, Faith and Reason, 71-77. 
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claims, they resort to sophistic arguments. These are of two kinds: those directed against the 
Muʿtazilīs and those designed to prove the possibility of the Ashʿarī view. 
Concerning the first kind, Ibn Rushd explains that the Ashʿarīs oppose the Muʿtazilīs 
by arguing that not every object seen needs to be situated in a location relative to the one 
seeing it because that principle applies only in the visible world, not the invisible. No location 
is required if the human sees without eyes. Ibn Rushd rejects this as confusing the intellect, 
which perceives things not situated in a location or place, with the power of sight. Sight 
depends on the object seen being located in a specific place, and it requires light, a transparent 
intermediary body, and color in the object seen. For Ibn Rushd, only objects that are colored 
can be seen. 
The second kind of argument made by the Ashʿarīs seeks to prove the possibility of 
seeing a God who has no body. Within this kind, Ibn Rushd reports two arguments. The first 
proceeds as follows. Something may be seen by virtue of its being either colored, or 
corporeal, or a color, or an existent. Now difficulties follow from saying that something is 
seen by virtue of its being colored, corporeal, or simply a color. Thus, the Ashʿarīs argue, a 
thing is most certainly seen by virtue of its being an existent. Ibn Rushd rejects the possibility 
of seeing something without color, and he adds that, if something could be seen merely by 
virtue of being an existent, then sounds could be seen as well. Other such absurdities would 
also result. The second argument is attributed by Ibn Rushd to the Ashʿarī theologian al-
Juwaynī. According to this argument, the senses perceive things in themselves and not by 
virtue of the states that distinguish one thing from another because those states are not things 
existing in themselves. Ibn Rushd rejects this as invalid because sight would not be able to 
distinguish things on the basis of color if things could not be distinguished by their states. 
According to Ibn Rushd, the cause of the Ashʿarī difficulties on the vision of God is 
their open denial of divine corporeality among the general public in direct contravention of 
revelation. The revelation did not permit denying body of God. This is because the general 
public has difficulty believing that one can see something incorporeal. The minds of the 
general public are confined to what they can imagine, and the revelation would have stated 
clearly that God had no body if it had intended to do so. Instead, as Ibn Rushd noted earlier in 
his discussion of God and body, the revelation likens God to light, the most highly exalted of 
existents accessible to the senses and the imagination, and then it indicates as well that people 
will see God in the hereafter as they see the sun, all of which does not subject the general 
public to doubt. Such images are also fitting for the learned elite who know by demonstration 
that the vision is in reality an increase in knowledge. From this, Ibn Rushd concludes that the 
17 
 
 
vision should be taken in its plain sense and without openly denying or affirming that God has 
a body. 
After quoting the entirety of Ibn Rushd’s section on the vision in Kashf, Ibn Taymiyya 
provides a vigorous response, which is translated here in full. 
 
It is known that this man [Ibn Rushd] adopts the view of the philosophers and [the 
view] that most of the things that the messengers reported concerning belief in 
God and the Last Day are similitudes (amthāl) propounded [for the general 
public]. This is the most corrupt of views, and it is the view of the clever among 
the irreligious hypocrites. They might know that it is hypocrisy (nifāq) and 
irreligion (zandaqa), but they still consider it to be the perfection of truth and 
knowledge just as these philosophers consider it to be that. This is not the place to 
elucidate this. The point is simply that even though he adopts the view of the 
philosophers and the Muʿtazilīs concerning the vision [of God] at the esoteric 
level—that it is an increase in knowledge, as a group of the later Ashʿarīs 
similarly think—he indeed knows that it is not possible [that the Ashʿarīs] affirm 
the vision that the lawgiver reported while denying that they say He is a body, and 
that, on the contrary, affirming it necessarily entails that they say that He is a body 
and a location. It has become plain that combining these two things opposes what 
is perceived by reason and the senses. This is what he has made plain by proof, 
and it is accepted from him. 
As for his claim that [the vision] at the esoteric level is an increase in 
knowledge, he did not mention any argument as proof for it, and it has become 
plain from the preceding that he has no argument for the principle behind that, 
which is the denial that He is a body, except to affirm that the rational soul (al-
nafs al-nāṭiqa) is not a body. He made plain the corruption of the kalām 
theologians’ arguments that God is not a body with clear arguments. Now, it is 
known that the principle upon which he built [his own] denial, that is, the matter 
of the soul, is weaker by far and that the great majority of rational people laugh at 
what these [philosophers] say about the soul in regard to the negative attributes 
[e.g. incorporeality] more than they laugh at those who affirm seeing something 
that does not—in their terminology—have a body and is not [situated] in a 
location. We have made this plain elsewhere. 
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As for his allegation and the allegation of others among the Jahmīs, the 
Muʿtazilīs, and those who are like them that the vision that the Messenger 
reported is an increase in knowledge, anyone who pays attention to the texts 
knows necessarily that the Messenger reported the vision of something that will 
be seen. Moreover, clear rational proofs permit this vision, even though the 
methods that he mentions are not to be used to show that. Those weak methods 
are weak because those who use them only establish the vision of something that 
is neither in a location, nor spatially extended (mutaḥayyiz), nor dwelling in 
something spatially extended. On account of this, they argue for divesting the 
vision of the preconditions required for it to take place because they believe that 
those preconditions are impossible with regard to God. 
If it is said that it is correct that everything subsisting in itself is seen, as 
commonly understood, and if it is made a precondition that what is seen be 
[situated] in a location relative to the one who sees and that it be spatially 
extended and subsisting in something spatially extended, then it is not possible for 
rational people to dispute the possibility of proofs for the possibility of that vision. 
Those who deny it only deny it because they think that God—Exalted is He—is 
not above the world and that He—in their terminology—is not a body, not 
spatially extended, not dwelling in something spatially extended, and such like 
among the negative attributes that they have innovated, not to mention their 
opposition to authentic tradition and clear reason. 
The point here is that those disputing the author [al-Rāzī] say to him: We 
affirm that the vision of the Lord is possible by the Book, the Sunna, and 
consensus, and by clear rational proofs. We affirm by necessity and by rational 
inquiry that only that which—in their terminology—is in a location, is spatially 
extended, or dwells in something spatially extended is seen. If it is established that 
only that which is spatially extended or dwells in something spatially extended is 
seen, and that what makes this possible is existence and its perfection, it has been 
established that there are no existents that are not spatially extended or not 
dwelling in something spatially extended. On the contrary, it has been established 
that it is impossible for that to exist. This preserves this attribute [of visibility] for 
the soul, for the angels, and for the Lord—Glory be to Him, Exalted is He.60 
 
                                                 
60 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān, 2:450-453. 
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In this discussion of Ibn Rushd’s comments on the vision of God in Kashf, Ibn Taymiyya first 
criticizes Ibn Rushd for his esotericism but then gratefully accepts the philosopher’s rational 
arguments against the Ashʿarīs: it is indeed not possible to affirm the vision of God and deny 
corporeality of God simultaneously. Ibn Taymiyya goes on to reject Ibn Rushd’s 
interpretation of the vision as an increase in knowledge, and he explains that Ibn Rushd’s 
foundation for this is his argument earlier in Kashf for the incorporeality of God from the 
alleged incorporeality of the soul. Ibn Taymiyya dismisses this argument as obviously weaker 
than the arguments of even the Ashʿarīs. With the field now cleared for his own view, Ibn 
Taymiyya explains that the vision of God is reported from the Messenger and that it is 
rationally possible and rationally defensible. Moreover, if one must speak in terms of kalām 
theology, the only existents that actually exist and can be seen are those that involve spatial 
extension. The implication, which Ibn Taymiyya does not quite draw out explicitly, is that 
God himself is spatially extended. Otherwise, God could not be seen in the hereafter. The 
work that Ibn Rushd performs for Ibn Taymiyya on the vision of God is rational refutation of 
the Ashʿarī position. This paves the way for Ibn Taymiyya to affirm that believers will see 
God in the hereafter in a particular location. This is the position that Ibn Rushd himself 
prescribes for the general public. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, we return to the question with which we began: why was Ibn Rushd of 
interest to Ibn Taymiyya specifically? It is not just that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Rushd often 
agree on what the plain senses of the theological content of the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth mean. 
It is also that Ibn Rushd in Kashf supports his interpretations with sophisticated 
rationalizations and provides rational arguments against opponents. Ibn Taymiyya recognizes 
this, turns it to his purposes, and perhaps even learns from it as he works out his own 
theology. Ibn Taymiyya has no sympathy for Ibn Rushd’s esotericism and explicit 
incorporealism at the level of the learned elite, but, as we have seen in this study of Bayān, he 
does welcome the philosopher’s Aristotelian rationalization of God’s location above the 
world, his defense of revelation’s silence on whether God has a body at the level of the 
general public, and his refutation of Ashʿarī arguments for the possibility of seeing an 
incorporeal God. Ibn Rushd provides Ibn Taymiyya rational resources to resist and 
marginalize al-Rāzī’s incorporealism and to affirm that God is indeed located above the 
heavens without resort to incorporealist reinterpretation. It was the incorporealism of the likes 
of al-Rāzī that predominated in the later Ashʿarī tradition, as well as in the Sunnī and Shīʿī 
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theological traditions more broadly. At this stage of our knowledge, it appears that Ibn 
Taymiyya was the foremost and perhaps only medieval advocate of Ibn Rushd’s ideas, or at 
least some of them, in the eastern lands of Islam. Ibn Taymiyya was no Averroist philosopher, 
but he did put Ibn Rushd to use for his own traditionalist ends. 
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